4.
But logical judgments are not the deepest and most fundamental to which the daring of our suspicion descends: the confidence in reason which is inseparable from the validity of these judgments, is, as confidence, a moral phenomenon perhaps German pessimism has yet to take its last step? Perhaps it has once more to draw up its credo opposite its absurdum in a terrible manner? And if this book is pessimistic even in regard to morals, even above the confidence in moralsshould it not be a German book for that very reason? For, in fact, it represents a contradiction, and one which it does not fear: in it confidence in morals is retractedbut why? Out of morality! Or how shall we call that which takes place in itin us? for our taste inclines to the employment of more modest phrases. But there is no doubt that to us likewise there speaketh a thou shalt; we likewise obey a strict law which is set above usand this is the last cry of morals which is still audible to us, which we too must live: here, if anywhere, are we still men of conscience, because, to put the matter in plain words, we will not return to that which we look upon as decayed, outlived, and superseded, we will not return to something unworthy of belief, whether it be called God, virtue, truth, justice, love of ones neighbour, or what not; we will not permit ourselves to open up a lying path to old ideals; we are thoroughly and unalterably opposed to anything that would intercede and mingle with us; opposed to all forms of presentday faith and Christianity; opposed to the lukewarmness of all romanticism and fatherlandism; opposed also to the artistic sense of enjoyment and lack of principle which would fain make us worship where we no longer believefor we are artistsopposed, in short, to all this European feminism (or idealism, if this term be thought preferable) which everlastingly draws upward, and which in consequence everlastingly lowers and degrades. Yet, being men of this conscience, we feel that we are related to that German uprightness and piety which dates back thousands of years, although we immoralists and atheists may be the late and uncertain offspring of these virtuesyea, we even consider ourselves, in a certain respect, as their heirs, the executors of their inmost will: a pessimistic will, as I have already pointed out, which is not afraid to deny itself, because it denies itself with joy! In us is consummated, if you desire a formulathe autosuppression of morals.
5.
But, after all, why must we proclaim so loudly and with such intensity what we are, what we want, and what we do not want? Let us look at this more calmly and wisely; from a higher and more distant point of view. Let us proclaim it, as if among ourselves, in so low a tone that all the world fails to hear it and us! Above all, however, let us say it slowly. This preface comes late, but not too late: what, after all, do five or six years matter? Such a book, and such a problem, are in no hurry; besides, we are friends of the lento, I and my book. I have not been a philologist in vainperhaps I am one yet: a teacher of slow reading. I even come to write slowly. At present it is not only my habit, but even my tastea perverted taste, maybeto write nothing but what will drive to despair every one who is in a hurry. For philology is that venerable art which exacts from its followers one thing above allto step to one side, to leave themselves spare moments, to grow silent, to become slowthe leisurely art of the goldsmith applied to language: an art which must carry out slow, fine work, and attains nothing if not lento. For this very reason philology is now more desirable than ever before; for this very reason it is the highest attraction and incitement in an age of work: that is to say, of haste, of unseemly and immoderate hurryskurry, which is intent upon getting things done at once, even every book, whether old or new. Philology itself, perhaps, will not get things done so hurriedly: it teaches how to read well: i.e. slowly, profoundly, attentively, prudently, with inner thoughts, with the mental doors ajar, with delicate fingers and eyes my patient friends, this book appeals only to perfect readers and philologists: learn to read me well!
RUTA, NEAR GENOA,
Autumn, 1886.
Book I
1
SUBSEQUENT JUDGMENT.All things that endure for a long time are little by little so greatly permeated by reason that their origin in unreason becomes improbable. Does not almost every exact statement of an origin strike us as paradoxical and sacrilegious? Indeed, does not the true historian constantly contradict?
2.
PREJUDICE OF THE LEARNED.Savants are quite correct in maintaining the proposition that men in all ages believed that they knew what was good and evil, praiseworthy and blamable. But it is a prejudice of the learned to say that we now know it better than any other age.
3.
A TIME FOR EVERYTHING.When man assigned a sex to all things, he did not believe that he was merely playing; but he thought, on the contrary, that he had acquired a profound insight:it was only at a much later period, and then only partly, that he acknowledged the enormity of his error. In the same way, man has attributed a moral relationship to everything that exists, throwing the cloak of ethical significance over the worlds shoulders. One day all that will be of just as much value, and no more, as the amount of belief existing today in the masculinity or femininity of the sun.[2]