Fig. 5. In the figure, survival corresponds to both the good and the not good, with an incident flight. Thus, good and evil does not correspond to survival, but rather expresses an attitude to the problem of death. This gives an assessment of not good to the flight with the incident.
We can also identify the essential binding of good and evil completely abstractly. For example, in the case of a game, when one person is looking for an object in a room, and another tells him, cold warmer colder hot, we understand that we only conditionally color proximity to the goal with a certain physical connotation. So, when the seeker approaches a hidden object, warmer or colder means approaching or moving away from the goal, not the physical temperature of the goal. The desired object does not exude heat but is endowed with such a property for the convenience of communication. Therefore, the words warm / cold can be replaced without losing the meaning of the described game with positive / negative, or good / bad, and, finally, good / evil. In fact, nothing at all will change. Therefore, good and evil are not good or bad in themselves, they only allow a person to search for some fundamental essence. And this essence, as a result of the game, will not appear to us in any form of good or evil, such as the embodied negative / positive, warmth / cold, as you have already guessed.
Note, an interesting point: the result of the game resets good and evil. After finding the desired entity, we are no longer interested in these categories.
Further, it is necessary to clarify the following statement of Aristotle: «But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities.»
It is not clear why Aristotle defined goals in two ways: as activities and as results. In theory, only activity leads to result. Can there be an activity in itself as a goal that does not need the result generated by it? Probably, but then, if the result of such an activity-goal is still generated, can it be undesirable in the sense that such an activity-goal should always be unfinished or never ending? And wouldnt it be easier in this case to call activity-goal simply goal, and efforts that do not allow it to result activity? At least then we wont have to mix the concepts together. When Aristotle mentions goals that exist separately from activity, what goal can we achieve without doing anything for it? Do we need a goal that does not need to be achieved in any way? Neither by physical actions, nor by thoughts meaning, even desire. After all, in this case, we would rather call it not a goal, but a given.
In future work, Aristotle still makes an attempt to deal with goals and activities more constructively, but since the starting point is chosen incorrectly the desire for good as a non-existent goal then he does not logically come to understanding the problem, repeatedly returning to happiness, then to being as an activity.
«For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states»
So, trying to naturalize the good, Aristotle brings us to the concept of the good of the state, which can be interpreted as the good of society for the good of man, as the goal of any activity. But, as we found out earlier, if the good in itself does not mean anything, but is only a parameter or a guideline in the process of achieving some goal, then Aristotle, making a cross-linking of the good and the goal, gives a false goal in his presentation of ethics. Actually, he even understands this himself, «And goods also give rise to a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people»
After a few sentences, we see another glimpse of the thinkers consciousness, «because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action.» that is, in this place, Aristotle sees an understanding that good and harm are only guidelines for activity to achieve something, pointers for activity, but not the goal itself. However, later on, Aristotle tries again to define good as something in itself, equating it with happiness, but immediately making sure that happiness is very relative, internally and externally contradictory, therefore in this context it cannot be a goal.
Here is a good point in the reasoning: «but the term «good is used both in the category of substance and in that of quality and in that of relation, and that which is per se, i.e., substance, is prior in nature to the relative (for the latter is like an off shoot and accident of being); so that there could not be a common Idea set over all these goods.» Here it concerns the relationship and this is exactly what is needed. The parametric dichotomy of positive and negative expresses an attitude towards a certain goal as an entity. It remains only to find the most important thing, the being to which the attitude is expressed.
Here Aristotle, after wandering a few paragraphs in arguments that do not have a point of reference, still gives out a sober thought again, «Are goods one, then, by being derived from one good or by all contributing to one good?» yes, thats exactly the point, I want to answer him, its just a pity that the source is located in a completely different direction from where Aristotle is looking for.
As a result, Aristotle relieves himself of the concern of searching for a single source, saying, «But perhaps these subjects had better be dismissed for the present And similarly with regard to the Idea; even if there is some one good which is universally predicable of goods or is capable of separate and independent existence, clearly it could not be achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking something attainable.»
Now let us turn to the part of Ethics in which Aristotle still touches the subject we are looking for, which on one hand does not allow him to achieve harmony in his ethical constructions, and on the other, this subject itself could serve as a solid core for any ethical search, if it were taken as a starting point. He says, «Now death is the most terrible of all things; for it is the end, and nothing is thought to be any longer either good or bad for the dead.» indeed, but death is exactly what only man has understood so far, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. And it is death, according to Aristotle, that nullifies good and evil. If we are talking about good and evil as a relation to death, is not all the source of specificity of man here? Yes, thats right, the whole phenomenology of human is generated through his attitude to death.
How a human considers life and death, and how nature consider it, are fundamentally different. Nature has no categories of relations at all and there is no good and evil in nature. But a human has these categories, they give him a unique specificity. Therefore, if we understand the reason for the existence of these categories for human, it means to be able to define the phenomenon of human itself.
Then, Aristotle plunges into cyclical discussions of the golden mean, repeating the same thing over and over again, « implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art, while the mean preserves it» If you think about what is said here, it is possible that the main thing is not that it is excess or lack, but rather disastrous or beneficial. When Aristotle judges good or evil, the thought boils down to whether the subject (person, society, or state) perishes or continues to live. This question constantly appears in any reasoning, as if this is all that is being discussed, meaning the same thing in different formulations. To show this, Aristotle says, «as we see in the case of strength and of health both excessive and defective exercise destroys the strength, and similarly drink or food which is above or below a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is propo tionate both produces and increases and preserves it; temperance and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and preserved by the mean; and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death» And so, time after time, almost about the same thing: to be or not to be, thats the question. So, isnt that really the question? Yes, it is.